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NOTE
DISCO VERY RULE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT: THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. KUBRICK
WAS NOT MEANT TO BE SECONDARY
AUTHORITY
By: Cory Zajdel*
Imagine a judiciary arranged into numerous levels of courts in a
hierarchal system including a high court which has the power to select
the cases it will hear. This high court also hands down final decisions
that can only be overturned by the people as a whole, or in some
instances, by congressional statutory amendment. Under no
circumstance may a lower court directly disagree with this high court.
Now, imagine the same legal system with one minor exception: If the
lower court concludes the high court decided a case wrongly, the lower
court can write an opinion in which it seemingly agrees with the high
court, but actually changes or modifies previous high court decisions.
While this scenario seems unthinkable in the United States, lower
courts have continually altered and extended the reasoning of United
States v. Kubrick.' In Kubrick, the high court ruled on the meaning of
"accrual" 2 within the statute of limitations3 pertaining to medical
"Cory Zajdel, J.D. candidate, 2004, The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law.
1. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years
after such a claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after
the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial
of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
3. Id.
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malpractice4  under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FrCA").5
Accordingly, if the issue presented in Kubrick is not re-clarified,
Kubrick6 will become a "dead letter.",
7
The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the original two-
year administrative filing requirement under the FTCA statute of
8limitations. In part I, this note examines crucial background
information regarding both the FFCA and federal sovereign
immunity! In part II, this note discusses the Supreme Court's decision
in Kubrick.'0 In part III, this note explores two different ways the
discovery rule, as formalized in Kubrick, has been interpreted by the
lower courts in deciding medical malpractice cases under the FTCA."
In part IV, this note illustrates a missed opportunity to clarify and limit
the discovery rule in Hughes v. United States." Lastly, this note
14 . . 1suggests3 what can be done by administrative agencies, the judiciary,"
and the legislature 16 to remedy the spreading epidemic of judicial
anarchy within the ever-searching FTCA "discovery rule"
jurisprudence.
4. Medical malpractice is a form of negligence. In order to prove negligence,
a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant (1) had a duty of care
(reasonable person standard), (2) breached the duty, (3) was the cause in fact, (4)
proximately caused the harm, and (5) that there was actual harm or damages. See
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 269 (2000). Similarly, a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case has the burden of proving these same elements. Id. at 631. The
major difference between the two types of actions is the duty of care element.
Under a negligence action, the defendant will be compared to how the reasonable
person would conduct himself. On the other hand, a medical malpractice action
will look to the minimal acceptable standard within the profession either in that
locality or nationally, as evidenced by expert witnesses. Id. at 631-33.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2000).
6. The purpose of this article is to prove that Kubrick was a valuable and
rational decision which should be followed. Unfortunately, in light of recent
appellate court decisions, Kubrick may have already become a "dead letter."
7. "A law or practice that, although not formally abolished, is no longer used,
observed, or enforced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (7th ed. 1999).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Hughes, 263 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 2001); see also infra Part V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See infra Part VI at A.
15. See infra Part VI at B.
16. See infra Part VI at C.
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I. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT ("FTCA")
The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
17
"Government - the sovereign - cannot be sued for negligence without
its consent."' 8 Prior to 1946, when the original version of the FTCA
was enacted, a citizen harmed from a tortious act by the federal
government or its employees had almost no redress.'9 Because of the
FTCA's inherent limited waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress drew
out various exceptions to possible claims. The FTCA's structure now
forces a claimant through a multitude of steps before a federal district
20
court attains jurisdiction to hear such a case.
17. Immunities are defined as "a defense to tort liability which is conferred on
an entire group or class of persons or entities under circumstances where
considerations of public policy are thought to require special protection for the
person, activity or entity in question at the expense of those injured by its tortious
act." EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL: INJURIES TO PERSONS AND
PROPERTY 398-401 (1977). Sovereign or governmental immunity originally came
from the concept in England, "The King can do no wrong." This meant that the
king was unable to commit a tort and that to file suit against the Crown
(Sovereign), the King must consent to it. Id. at 398-9; see also DOBBS, supra note 4,
at 693 (2000). Cf. 35 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 1, at 296 (1967 &
Supp. 1985). "Most immunities have fared poorly in recent decades in the U.S.
plaintiff-friendly courts, especially when health care is at issue. For example,
'charitable immunity,' which long shielded not-for-profit hospitals, has been cut
back sharply." John L. Akula, Sovereign Immunity and Health Care: Can
Government Be Trusted?; As its health care role expands, does government's legal
immunity undermine its accountability?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 152,
154.
18. Akula, supra note 17, at 154. For a full discussion on federal sovereign
immunity and specifically how it pertains to the FTCA, see L. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS (1993); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 380 (1821)
(stating that "a sovereign independent State is not suable, except by its own
consent").
19. The only exception to this rule was that a victim of a tortious act
committed by the federal government or its employees could try to pressure a
private bill through congress. A private bill authorized a particular plaintiff to sue
on his claim. However, this method was burdensome and time consuming. See
PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1033-4 (5th ed. 1984); see also
PROSSER ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 651 (10th ed. 2000).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).
2004]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 20:443
The first step requires that a claim must be presented to the proper
agency within two years2' after such a claim accrues.2 Determining the
date of accrual and counting off two years from that date23 is the cause
24
of much litigation in federal district courts. This first and all-
21. Originally, Congress only allowed one year from the date of accrual to
present this type of claim; however, congress amended this statute to allow for a
claimant to present his claim within two years from the date of accrual. See 28
U.S.C. § 2401(b) (amended on April 25, 1949, by deleting "one year" and inserting
"two years") (2000); "Rather than carve out certain exceptions to the statute of
limitations and thereby incorporate some form of equitable tolling into the FTCA,
Congress chose instead to increase the limitations period from one to two years for
all tort claimants." Richard Parker & Ugo Colella, Revisiting Equitable Tolling
and the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 885, 908 (1999).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000). "Section 2401(b).... is the balance struck by
Congress in the context of tort claims against the Government; and we are not free
to construe it so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to encourage the prompt
presentation of claims." Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (quoting Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895)); "The second time period prescribed in the FTCA applies
to the time within which a claimant must file suit in federal district court." Ugo
Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2915
(1999); see also Ugo Collela, The Case for Borrowing a Limitations Period for
Deemed-Denial Suits Brought Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 35 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 391, 406 (1998) (stating that the "the two-year period in 2401(b)
prescribes a time limit within which a claimant must submit her claim to an
administrative agency, and the six-month period prescribes a time limit within
which a claimant must file suit in an Article III court"). One reason the Supreme
Court has given for the importance of following a statute of limitation is that "[t]he
process of discovery and trial . . . is obviously more reliable if the witness or
testimony in question is relatively fresh." Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478, 487 (1980). Therefore, "there comes a point at which the delay of a plaintiff in
asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to impair the accuracy of the fact-
finding process or to upset settled expectations that a substantive claim will be
barred without respect to whether it is meritorious." Id.
23. Maahs v. United States, 840 F.2d 863 (11th Cir. 1988). This court held that
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) applies to claims brought against the
Federal Government under the FTCA. Under this reasoning, the day after accrual
is the date the government shall begin counting off two years for the purpose of
the statute of limitations within the FTCA. Id.
24. See Lieutenant Colonel Carl T. Grasso, The Statute of Limitations as
Applied to Medical Malpractice Actions Brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 117 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987); see also PROSSER ET AL., supra note 19, at 651.
"[L]awsuits against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act pending
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important procedural matter of accrual is not defined anywhere in the
statute.25
Prior to Supreme Court intervention, and because of a lack of
legislative guidance, determining the accrual of a claim under the
FTCA was subject to a variety of interpretations.2 1 "In FTCA actions
charging negligence, accrual generally occurs when the harm or injury
is inflicted., 27 This rule of law is referred to as the "injury discovery
rule." Although the injury discovery rule is the general rule for
measuring accrual, medical malpractice presents a special situation
because there are different circumstances when a potential claimant
lacks the knowledge that an invasion of a legally protected right has
occurred. 28 Kubrick is the controlling case on the matter of defining
"accrual" and implementing some form of a discovery rule in medical
malpractice claims under the FTCA.
II. KUBRICK V. UNITED STATES: DEFINITELY NOT NEGLIGENCE
DISCOVERY; RATHER, LEANING TOWARD INJURY DISCOVERY RULE
Without express approval from Congress or any preliminary hint
from the Supreme Court, an overwhelming number of federal district
courts began to incorporate a broad discovery rule into the FTCA.29 A
pre-Kubrick standard was "a malpractice action against the United
States can be maintained within two years after the claimant
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the existence of the acts of malpractice upon which his
before the federal courts at one time involve[d] claims of approximately $5 billion.
New suits are filed at the rate of more than 1,500 each year." L. JAYSON, supra
note 18, at 1, 8-9.
25. "Unfortunately, Congress has never addressed the question of when a
claim 'accrues' against the United States." David L. Abney, For Whom The
Statute Tolls: Medical Malpractice Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 696, 697 (1986).
26. See generally Grasso, supra note 24.
27. Abney, supra note 25, at 698.
28. "The causal connection between an injury and the federal government may
remain obscure or hidden for some time. The injury itself may remain unknown
for decades following the actual medical negligence. [This] will often delay
presentation of a valid tort claim beyond the apparently proper limitations
period." Id. at 721.
29. See Grasso, supra note 24, at 4-5.
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claim is based."3° The Supreme Court took up Kubrick to clarify the
FTCA discovery rule as applied to medical malpractice actions.3
Kubrick had surgery on his right femur at a Veterans'
Administration (VA) Hospital in 1968.32 "Following surgery, the
infected area was irrigated with neomycin, an antibiotic, until the
infection cleared. 3 3 Six weeks later, the veteran noticed ringing in his
ears and a slight loss of hearing. 34 Eventually, Kubrick filed a claim for
an increase in disability benefits 5 with the VA in 1969, "alleging that
the neomycin treatment had caused his deafness., 36 Kubrick's claim
for disability benefits was denied in September 1969. The claim was
denied again on reconsideration in August 1972. 37
Kubrick did not file his claim with the district court under the FTCA
until 1972. He claimed his injuries were due to negligent treatment in
the VA Hospital.38  The district court rejected the United States'
30. See id. Another standard used by circuit courts was stated, "[Ulntil
claimant has had a- reasonable opportunity to discover all of the essential elements
of a possible cause of action - duty, breach, causation, damages - his claim against
the Government does not accrue." See Major Carl M. Wagner, United States v.
Kubrick: Scope and Application, 120 MIL. L. REV. 139, 142 (quoting Bridgford v.
United States, 550 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1977)).
31. Specifically, the issue in Kubrick was "whether the claim 'accrues' within
the meaning of the Act when the plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause
of his injury or at a later time when he also knows that the acts inflicting the injury
may constitute medical malpractice." Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 113-4.
35. Veterans' benefits under 38 U.S.C § 1151 (2000) are an independent claim
that can coexist with a tort claim under the FTCA. A veteran can be awarded
increased benefits under § 1151 and win a tort claim under the FTCA under the
same cause of action.
36. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 114.
37. The Department of Veterans Affairs allows a claimant the ability to
contest its first administrative claim decision through both veterans benefits under
38 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) and tort claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000). These
administrative appeals are referred to as reconsiderations.
38. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 115 n.4. The administrative exhaustion requirement
in 28 U.S.C § 2675(a) (2000) states:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States
for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to
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argument that Kubrick's "claim had accrued in January 1969, when he
learned from Dr. Sataloff that his hearing loss had probably resulted
from the neomycin. ' '39 Instead, the district court held (consistent with
most other district courts) that a claim accrues only when a claimant
has discovered, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the malpractice. 40 The district court's decision was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit when it ruled that
Kubrick's claim did not accrue until June 1971.41 The Supreme Court
reversed.42
In its opinion, the Supreme Court began with a brief summary on
the importance of statutes of limitation 3 and then mentioned
Congress' decision to waive the government's sovereign immunity.44 In
doing so, the Court neither extended nor limited what Congress
originally intended.45
The Supreme Court announced, "It is undisputed in this case that in
January 1969 Kubrick was aware of his injury and its probable cause." 46
The Court would not go so far as to toll the statute of limitations until
Kubrick had discovered in 1971 that the treatment received was
malpractice. 7 Therefore, the lower court's conclusion that the statute
the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.
Even though Kubrick did not satisfy this requirement in only filing for § 1151
benefits, the United States dropped this issue on appeal. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 115-
6 n.4.
39. Kubrick v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 166, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
40. See id. at 180.
41. Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092, 1097 (3rd Cir. 1978), aff'g 435 F.
Supp. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). Under this reasoning,
Kubrick's claim was timely because the claim was filed within two years from June
1971.
42. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id. at 117-8
45. Id.
46. Id. at 118.
47. Id. The argument the Supreme Court makes in reference to Kubrick being
able to file his claim in 1975 or 1980 if Dr. Soma had not mentioned that the act
may have been malpractice is particularly the reason this author's conclusion
incorporates a statute of repose. Id. There must be a point in the future at which
time all claims become stale. Furthermore, the court mentions, "[wie ... cannot
hold that Congress intended that 'accrual' of a claim must await awareness by the
plaintiff that his injury was negligently inflicted." Id. at 123. See generally Sexton
v. United States, 832 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
2004]
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of limitation was tolled until the claimant had discovered the
48
malpractice was not supported by case law, legislative history, or the
actual language of the FTCA.49 In fact, the legislative history supports
the argument for an injury discovery rule where the date of accrual is
the time of injury.' ° Furthermore, there is a clear distinction between a
patient whose injury is not apparent immediately (injury in fact) and a
patient "in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and
who has inflicted the injury.""
Finally, the Court extended an invitation to Congress to amend the
statute at any time to "effect its legislative will."52 In coming to this
conclusion, the Court decided that where the legislative history is not
particularly clear, it is best to err on the side of narrowing the doctrine
rather then extending it past Congress' original intent. Therefore, the
Kubrick standard can be stated as a two-year statute of limitations
period that does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered or
should have discovered with reasonable diligence both his injury and
its cause, not at some later date when the plaintiff discovers
malpractice.
This accrual standard, although substantially limited as compared to
many district courts' previous interpretations, is still more generous to
plaintiffs than the average medical malpractice accrual standard."
III. CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE KUBRICK STANDARD
Although the Supreme Court established the test for future
"discovery rule" cases involving medical malpractice in Kubrick, the
circuits continue to split on the issue of accrual. 54 The overwhelming
48. For a thorough discussion on the importance or lack thereof with respect
to legislative history, see Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, Revisiting Equitable Tolling
and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Putting the Legislative History in Proper
Perspective, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 174, 182-85 (2000). For a further discussion
focusing on legislative history concerning the FfCA's statute of limitation, see id.
at 190-205.
49. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 119.
50. Id. at 119 n.6 (evaluating the meaning behind some of the legislative
history, specifically while discussion was going on regarding amending one year of
accrual to two years).
51. Id. at 122.
52. Id. at 125.
53. Id. at 120; see also id. at 125-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See generally Wagner, supra note 30, at 140.
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reason for the split in circuits can be attributed to the interpretation of
the specific amount of knowledge required to begin the accrual of a
claim." The knowledge requirement necessitates both knowledge of
the injury and the cause thereof. 6  While this question seems
elementary, various factual situations have given the circuits ample
ability to alter the limited confines of Kubrick."
Subsequent cases can be classified into two doctrines: "government
causation discovery rule" '58 and "causation discovery rule/immediate
physical cause."'59 Most of these decisions come down to the factual
determination of whether the injury was caused by an omission or
commissioni ° It is important to note that each decision involving these
55. Id. at 164.
56. Id. at 155-75 (general discussion on the different ways courts have
interpreted knowledge for claims involving medical malpractice and the accrual
standard under the FTCA).
57. Id. at 140.
58. See Drazan v. United States, 762 F.2d 56, 59 (7th Cir. 1985); Augustine v.
United States, 704 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1983); Diaz v. United States, 165 F.3d 1337
(11th Cir. 1999); McGraw v. United States, No. 00-35514, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
15774 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2002).
59. See Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Dawkins v.
United States, No. 99-1746, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4457 (6th Cir. Mar. 13, 2000);
Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1984); Arvayo v. United States,
766 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985); Price v. United States, 775 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.
1985).
60. See Richman v. United States, 709 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1983); Kronisch v.
United States, 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998); Edwards v. United States, No. 98-2075,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2688 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999); Kerstetter v. United States, 57
F.3d 362 (4th Cir. 1995); Dawkins v. United States, No. 99-1746, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4457 (6th Cir. Mar. 13, 2000); McCoy v. United States, 264 F.3d 792 (8th
Cir. 2001). Claimants' attorneys often try to differentiate their cause of action
from the Kubrick line of cases by asserting that the injury was caused by an
omission rather than a commission. See Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1078; see also
Arvayo, 766 F.2d at 1419 ("[Claimants] assert that there is a basic theoretical
distinction between malpractice cases involving a 'commission; - an affirmative
act which results in clearly identifiable injuries - and malpractice cases involving
an 'omission,' i.e., a failure to diagnose, treat, or warn."). They further argue that
an omission is not easily identifiable by a potential claimant because all the
necessary facts needed by the claimant are held by the person causing the harm -
the doctor. Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1078; McGraw, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15774, at
*8 ("[lIt is often very difficult for a plaintiff to determine the genesis of an injury
resulting from a doctor's omissions."). Conversely, other courts have found "[tihe
omission/commission divide [to be] largely elusive." Sexton, 832 F.2d at 634. For
cases that are pro-claimant, see Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1078; Drazan, 762 F.2d at
20041
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two standards correctly states and proclaims to agree with the Kubrick
standard. Each decision, however, finds a way to differentiate the fact
patterns to seemingly narrow Kubrick to only the particular facts of
the case. Arguably, not one circuit continues to follow the discovery
rule first enunciated in Kubrick.
A. Government Causation Discovery Rule Cases
Courts usually summarize the government causation discovery rule
doctrine by commenting that the statutory period does not run until
the "cause that is in the government's control" has been discovered.6
In Drazan v. United States,62 the Seventh Circuit examined the
knowledge requirement for purposes of starting the clock on the
63statute of limitations. The question in front of the court was whether
the statute of limitations began to run in February 1981 when the
claimant's surviving spouse "learned that her husband had died of lung
cancer," 64 or whether the limitations period began in December 1981
when "she received her husband's medical reports and discovered the
results of the [previously neglected] x-ray."65  The court began by
stating the Kubrick standard correctly.66  Next, the court stated
unambiguously that the injury to the claimant was death. 67 However,
the court ran into a small problem when defining the cause of the
injury. Here, the court found that "[w]hen there are two causes of an
injury, and only one is the government, the knowledge that is required
to set the statute of limitations running is knowledge of the
government cause, not just of the other cause." 68 Finally, the standard
the court set forth was that the statute of limitations "begins to run
either when the government cause is known or when a reasonably
59. For cases that are pro-government, see Sexton, 832 F.2d at 634 ("courts have
found adequate knowledge of injury and cause in situations where plaintiffs'
knowledge was far more limited as to the character of the government agents'
omission."); Dyniewicz, 742 F.2d at 486-87.
61. Drazan, 762 F.2d at 59; see also Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1074.
62. 762 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1985).
63. Wagner, supra note 30, at 164.
64. Drazan, 762 F.2d at 58.
65. Id.
66. Id. ("The statute of limitations in federal tort claims cases starts to run
when a person knows that he is injured and knows what caused the injury, even if
he does not know and has no reason to know that the cause involved negligence.")
67. Id. at 58-9.
68. Id. at 59.
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diligent person (in the tort claimant's position) reacting to any
suspicious circumstances of which he might have been aware would
have discovered the government cause - whichever comes first.,
69
This standard takes away any notion of the injury prong of the Kubrick
standard, instead relying strictly on knowledge of cause or reasonable
knowledge of suspicious circumstances to determine accrual under the
statute of limitations. This standard has been criticized as going
beyond Kubrick by incorporating notice of negligence, which was
specifically rejected by the Kubrick Court.70
In Diaz v. United States7 , the Eleventh Circuit was asked to decide
whether to follow the Drazan government causation discovery rule as
urged by the claimant, or to follow a strict rule, at the government's
urging, that claims accrue no later than on the date of death.72 The
court was "persuaded that Drazan presents the better rule., 73 In
following Drazan and the government causation discovery rule cases,
the Eleventh Circuit holds that "a wrongful death claim [that has
multiple causes] accrues when the plaintiff knows, or exercising
reasonable diligence should know, both of the decedent's death and its
causal connection with the government.,
74
B. Causation Discovery Rule Cases (Immediate Physical Cause)
Courts usually summarize the causation discovery rule doctrine to
mean that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knew
of the injury, who caused the injury, and why.75
In Sexton v. United States,76 a six-year-old child died of leukemia
after battling the disease for three years. 7 Although the child died in
1968, the parents did not present a wrongful death claim on behalf of
their child until 1983, nearly fifteen and a half years later.8 The
69. Id.
70. Wagner, supra note 30, at 165 ("The example given was not a good one
because it provided notice of both potential causation and potential negligence.").
71. Diaz, 165 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 1999).
72. Id. at 1340.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Sexton, 832 F.2d at 632; Arvayo, 766 F.2d at 1421; Price, 775 F.2d at 1494.
76. Sexton, 832 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 630.
78. Id.
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claimants argued that they did not have sufficient knowledge to be put
on notice and that the statute of limitations therefore did not begin to
run until June 14, 1981. 79 However, the court held that the claimants
had adequate knowledge at the date of their child's death. 8°
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court began by stating
81that Kubrick applied in this case, commenting, "It seems simple
enough to say that the basic injury was death. 8 2 When discussing
cause, the court found that "a plaintiff's understanding of the basic
nature of the treatment should suffice to begin the statute running"
8 3
and that these were the critical facts which put an affirmative duty on
the claimants to determine whether on not they have obtained a cause
of action. 84 The court stressed that "Kubrick regarded ... the historical
facts associated with the injury itself [as critical]." '85 With this in mind,
the court effectively adopted the immediate physical cause test: "the
'cause' is known when the immediate physical cause of the injury is
discovered.8 16 Therefore, the injury was death to the claimant, and the
immediate physical cause of the death was leukemia. The critical
question of "why" in the Kubrick inquiry may be answered by another
medical professional. Claimants knew that two types of treatment
were used while under the watchful eye of government doctors; they
need now only ask whether or not they have a viable claim.87
Accordingly, the court ruled that the claimants had failed to present
their claim within the two-year statute of limitations period.8
A similar conclusion was reached by the Tenth Circuit in Arvayo v.
United States.89 In August 1979, a military base doctor misdiagnosed a
79. Id. at 632. Claimants' argument that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until June 14, 1981, which was exactly two years and one day after the death
of their child, would have been timely under § 2401, as mentioned supra note 23,
where the court acknowledged that the clock starts the day after the knowledge of
injury and cause.
80. Sexton, 832 F.2d at 632.
81. Id. at 633 ("We think that [nothing here] prevents the application of
Kubrick.").
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (referring to the concepts in Kubrick involving the reasonably diligent
claimant's investigation after assuming an affirmative duty).
85. Id. at 634.
86. Id. (citing Zeleznik v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 23 (3rd Cir. 1985)).
87. See Sexton, 832 F.2d at 633-4 (example of when this analysis can be used).
88. Id. at 637.
89. Arvayo, 766 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985).
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baby as having an upper respiratory infection which was rectified the
next day with a correct diagnosis of meningitis. 90 The district court
ruled that the claim did not accrue until August 1981,91 thus giving the
claimants until August 1983 to file a timely claim under the FTCA.
The court stated, and both parties agreed, that the injury was mental
retardation, brain damage. A significant argument remained, however,
as to the cause of injury. 2 The government, withdrawing from its
initial proffer for a strict injury discovery rule, urged the court that the
cause of the brain damage was bacterial meningitis. 9 On the other
hand, the claimants argued the cause was not only the meningitis, but
• • 94
also the failure to diagnose and treat the meningitis. Ultimately, the
court agreed that there could be two causes to an injury.9'
Furthermore, the court held that under these facts,96 where the injury
was known to the claimants and where there was also some knowledge
of a misdiagnosis or change in diagnosis, "a reasonable person in the
[claimants'] position would have made some type of inquiry as to
whether [the doctor's] diagnosis had been correct." Therefore, the
court held that a reasonable person in the claimants' position would
have inquired into the suspicious diagnosis.98
Finally, in Dyniewicz v. United States,99 Mark and Carol Dyniewicz
were killed in a flood on a Hawaii highway in March 1980.1°° Although
this case did not involve medical malpractice, the discovery rule
discussion is instructive. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[d]iscovery
of the cause of one's injury . . . does not mean knowing who is
90. Id. at 1417-8.
91. Id. at 1418 (discussing the district court's memorandum opinion).
92. Id. at 1419.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1420.
96. Id. at 1422 ("We do not intend to imply that in every failure to diagnose,
treat, or warn case the plaintiff's cause of action accrues at the time the plaintiff
receives a diagnosis different from a previous diagnosis and is aware that he or she
has been injured.").
97. Id. at 1422-3. "[O]nce the plaintiffs knew the bare facts that doctors
treating their son had made two different diagnoses.., within twenty-four hours,
they were under a duty to inquire into the medical treatment of their child to
determine if the misdiagnosis might have been a cause of his injuries." Sexton, 832
F.2d at 634.
98. Arvayo, 766 F.2d at 1422-3.
99. Dyniewicz, 742 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 485.
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responsible for it. The 'cause' is known when the immediate physical
cause of the injury is discovered."10' The cause of action accrues at the
point in time where injury and immediate physical cause are known to
the claimants. The court held, consistent with other courts following
the government causation or immediate physical cause discovery rule,
that "[a]ppellants knew both the fact of injury and its immediate
physical cause, the flooded highway, when the bodies of Mr. and Mrs.
Dyniewicz were found."'2 Therefore, the claim was deemed
untimely.'3
IV. HUGHES V. UNITED STATES:"° THE NEWEST JUDICIAL FOLLY
(THE THIRD CIRCUIT WRITES ITS OWN LAW)
The discovery rule issue has been relatively quiet in the recent past.
Courts have either followed the government causation or immediate
physical cause reasoning. Hughes, however, has brought back to life
the same issues resolved in the Kubrick decision. The decision in
Hughes is important because it shows a blatant disregard for stare
decisis,10 ' while reintroducing uncertainty to both claimants and the
101. Id. at 486. "The general rule in tort law is that the claim accrues at the time
of the plaintiff's injury." Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 330 (9th
Cir. 1981)). Furthermore, "[w]ith knowledge of the fact of injury and its cause the
malpractice plaintiff is on the same footing as any negligence plaintiff."
Dyniewicz, 742 F.2d at 486 (quoting Davis, 642 F.2d at 331).
102. Dyniewicz, 742 F.2d at 487.
103. Id. at 487.
104. Hughes v. United States, No. CIV.A. 00-3065, 2000 WL 1586080, at *1
(E.D. Pa. 2000).
105. The Supreme Court consistently discusses the importance of following
judicial precedent. In upholding the central holding of a prior Supreme Court
decision, the Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
stated:
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary
necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no
judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every
case that raised it. Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying
our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensable. At the other extreme, a
different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should
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government alike. Furthermore, the decision in Hughes has altered
the settlement prospects during the administrative exhaustion
requirement.
The critical facts in Hughes v. United States'° are disturbingly similar
to those of Kubrick. Nevertheless, Hughes is the furthest any court has
stretched the Kubrick standard to date. The outcome of this case is
unfortunate because the district court decided it correctly at first, only
to have the decision overturned by a policy-driven court of appeals.
Raymond Hughes was admitted to a Department of Veterans
Affairs Medical Center ("VAMC") on April 15, 1997, at which time he
was given Heparin, a blood thinner, in preparation for a cardiac
catheterization and a subsequent coronary bypass surgery.'0 7 Hughes
remained on the blood thinner for eight days. '0 At some point
between April 16 and June 4 when Hughes was unconscious, he
developed gangrene of the extremities. Specifically, the VAMC had
to amputate "his right leg above the knee, left hand, right metacarpal,
and left leg below the knee.""0 The doctor informed Hughes that the
amputation was caused by an allergic reaction to the blood thinner
medication."'
Hughes then filed for 38 U.S.C. § 1151 benefits. Showing interest
in a possible tort claim, Hughes consulted an attorney in April 1999,
almost two years after leaving the hospital."' After receiving the
medical records from the VA and having them reviewed by a
professional in the medical field, the attorney decided not to take the
case."4 Finally, Hughes filed an administrative tort claim on December
16, 1999, two years and four months after the claimant's discharge
from the VAMC and two years and six months after regaining•11516
consciousness. This claim was subsequently denied.1
6
come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very
reason doomed.
505 U.S. at 854 (citations omitted).
106. Hughes, 2000 WL 1586080, at *1.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Hughes, 2000 WL 1586080, at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *2-3.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
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Hughes argued that he did not know he had a tort claim as a result
of the "doctors' assurances that because of his previously unknown
allergy, the amputations were unavoidable. 117 In response, the court
determined that "this point highlights plaintiff's awareness not only of
his injury but also its cause.""18 The district court concluded that
Hughes' claim accrued sometime during June or July of 1997 at the
point when he realized he was an amputee. 1 9
Conversely, when this case reached the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit,' 20 the court instantly characterized the
case as one having to do with the failure to diagnose and treat, or a
case involving an omission. After agreeing not to extend the
definition past Congress' original intent in the F[CA,22 and after
123fleshing out both the claimants' and the government's arguments, the
court proceeded to review the Kubrick standard. 24 The Third Circuit
determined that Kubrick stood for the proposition that "once the
plaintiff knows 'the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has
inflicted the injury,' he can seek medical and legal advice to determine
whether the medical care he received was substandard and whether he
has a viable cause of action for negligence. 1 25  Although correctly
stating the standard, the court distinguished this case from Kubrick
because here the injury was the direct result of the "VA doctors'
failure to monitor and treat his reaction to the heparin,"' 126 while in
Kubrick the injury directly resulted from the administration of a
particular drug. 2 7 Under this reasoning, two classes of cases were
announced and recognized in the Third Circuit: 1) injury discovery and
2) government causation. In distinguishing Hughes from Kubrick, and,
117. Id. at *8.
118. Hughes, 2000 WL 1586080, at *8.
119. Id. at *9.
120. Hughes v. United States, 263 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 2001).
121. Id. at 274.
122. Id. at 275.
123. "[Hughes'] argument is that giving him the heparin did not cause his injury;
rather, it was caused by the failure of the treating physicians timely to apply
anticoagulants and other appropriate treatment to combat the [allergic reaction]."
Id. "[Tihe government argues that Hughes had all relevant information about his
injury and its cause when he was discharged on July 23, 1997, the date it claims the
statute of limitations began to run." Id.
124. Id. at 275-6.
125. Id. (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122).
126. Hughes, 263 F.3d. at 276.
127. Id.
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in so doing, distinguishing injury discovery from government causation,
this court seemingly eliminates any surviving remnants of the Kubrick
decision in the Third Circuit. By applying a causation analysis to the
procedural aspect of this case, the court jumps ahead of itself.
At this point, the court should not be in search of whether or not the
claimant can win a case on the merits with respect to the issue of
causation, but rather into which category of patient the particular
claimant falls. Kubrick clearly states, "The prospect is not so bleak for
a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and
who has inflicted the injury."'8 Therefore, Kubrick postulates two
classes of patient: (1) a patient whose injury does not immediately
present itself, and (2) a patient who recognizes he has been harmed or
injured and knows who was responsible for this injury. The former
patient may not know of his injury until it manifests, and therefore
"the facts about causation may be in the control of the putative
defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to
obtain,' ' 129 while the latter patient will receive no protection from the
court because it was his duty to move forward as a reasonable person
would in search of the critical facts behind the cause of the injury.
Once an injury has presented itself to the patient, the specific details
behind the cause are easily identified by other members of the same
profession.3 ° Therefore, the most important question that can be
asked in a medical malpractice action for the purpose of accrual of the
statute of limitations under the FTCA is, What constitutes injury?
Clearly, in the Hughes case the injury was the amputation, the cause
was the reaction to Heparin, and the alleged negligence was the failure
to timely diagnose and treat the reaction. By confusing knowledge of
cause with knowledge of negligence, the Third Circuit follows the
opinion directly repudiated in Kubrick.1
3 1
Hughes has all the makings of a Kubrick II. Kubrick starts accrual as
of the time when the claimant knows or has reason to know of both the
existence of an injury and its probable relation to medical treatment.'32
Here, there can be no doubt that the injury was known to Hughes at
the very time he woke up because the injury was so severe that notice
was hard to deny. Furthermore, Hughes was under the care of the
government constantly from the time he went into heart surgery with
128. Kubrick, 411 U.S. at 122.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092 (3rd Cir. 1978) (negligence portion
of the discovery rule doctrine was eliminated by Kubrick).
132. See generally United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
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all limbs intact until he awoke a quadruple amputee. Additionally,
Hughes was notified by a doctor of the immediate physical cause of his
injury, the allergic reaction to Heparin, as soon as he regained
consciousness. 4 Using the Kubrick standard, "The prospect is not so
bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been
hurt and who has inflicted the injury." 3 ' Thus, the government will not
allow such a claimant to sit on his knowledge of the facts which verify
injury and cause.
The Hughes court significantly altered the well-established meaning
of injury by mistakenly incorporating cause into the injury prong
rather than leaving cause as its own prong. This knowledgeable
claimant should have been considered accrued under the FTCA.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR GETTING BACK TO KUBRICK
With the decision in Hughes taking the FTCA discovery rule further
then it has ever been extended in the past, it is now time for reform.
This reform can be accomplished through administrative agencies, the
Supreme Court, or the legislature.
A. Administrative Agencies
When an administrative agency originally denies a medical
malpractice claim, the lawyer in charge of the claim should make a
strong "discovery rule" argument. The lawyer should also alert the
U.S. Attorney's Office that the case would be a good or bad candidate
for Supreme Court review in order to make sure the proper evidence is
entered into the record at the district court level. Furthermore, if and
when the case reaches the Solicitor General's Office after making its
way up through the appeals process, pressure must be placed from the
top levels of the agency in order to have the Solicitor General's Office
133. Hughes, 263 F.3d at 273-4.
134. Id. at 274. Furthermore, even under a causation discovery rule/immediate
physical cause, the claimant's argument should have failed on the statute of
limitations argument.
135. Hughes, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15470, at *8 (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at
122).
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agree to write a brief on the agency's behalf. Policy should come
before publicity, and politics must defer to legal reasoning.
116
B. Supreme Court
Since the Supreme Court has the ability to control its own docket
through the writ of certiorari, the simple answer to a complex issue
could be as easy as the Supreme Court granting certiorari to a FTCA
"discovery rule" case. In the event that the Court declines to hear such
a case because Kubrick is still good law, Justices on the Court with a
strong disposition against the way lower courts have decided more
recent "discovery rule" cases under the FTCA should continue to
vocalize this opinion passionately within the dicta of other reported
opinions by discussing Kubrick specifically.
17
The Supreme Court recently mentioned the problems involved in
discovery rule cases in TRW Inc. v. Adelaide Andrews 3 8 and Rotella v.
Wood.3 9 In Rotella, while discussing the possibility of a "discovery
rule" under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), "° the majority said:
[I]n applying a discovery accrual rule, we have been at pains to
explain that discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other
elements of a claim, is what starts the clock. In the circumstance
of medical malpractice, where the cry for a discovery rule is
136. While it may look bad for a clear victim of tortious behavior administered
by an employee of the United States to be denied her day in court, justice requires
that the law be followed. Furthermore, the judgment fund, from which these
judgments and settlements are paid, derive from tax revenue. The judgment fund
has steadily increased in recent years. In other words, the harmed individual will
be rewarded out of innocent people's pockets when this does not need to be the
case.
137. Although there is nothing binding about dicta, Justices can often use it to
get across to lower courts their opinions of what they believe to be wrong in a
particular area of law that is parallel to the issue at hand.
138. 534 U.S. 19 (2001). Justices Scalia and Thomas in their concurring opinion
wrote that the period accrues "when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause
of action." Id. at 31-2. In rejecting an injury discovery rule, while never
mentioning Kubrick, Scalia asserted that those appeals should be made to
Congress. Id. at 34.
139. 528 U.S. 549 (2000).
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
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loudest, we have been emphatic that the justification for a
discovery rule does not extend beyond the injury.41
C. Legislature
Congress has remained silent for a long period of time on the
presumption that Kubrick had settled the controversy over what they
meant by the wording in the statute of limitations for the FTCA.
Meanwhile, the legislature could clear up this ambiguity in numerous
142
ways.
1. Enact a Separate Statute of Limitations for the FTCA
All claims against the federal government are governed by a statute
of limitations either written expressly into the language of the statute
or incorporated from a similar regulation at either the state or federal
level.14 ' As stated in Kubrick, "Statutes of limitations ... represent a
pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the
adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and
that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over
the right to prosecute them."' 44 The FTCA uses the multipurpose
2401(b) for its limitation.
The negative aspect of sharing a statute with other sections of the
U.S. Code is that it must be written in general terms, leaving room for
interpretation. If a separate section was written and approved by the
legislature, it could speak to each individual issue in a specific matter
while retaining the meaning for any other regulation sharing the
wording. Each person must have his own social security number
because each individual has distinct qualities and must be easily
distinguishable from everyone else. If two individuals have the same
social security number, they are sure to run into difficulties at some
point in their lives. Similarly, each statute should have its own
limitations provision because each statute is created for a different
purpose, written in a way specific to the cause.
141. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555-6.
142. The legislature might have been reluctant in the past to alter the wording
of § 2401(b), because it is the statute of limitations for multiple sections of the U.S.
Code.
143. See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 550.
144. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (quoting R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
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2. Add Language to the Definition Section
Congress should simply amend the IFTCA's definition section141 to
include a part codifying the Kubrick standard under the heading
"Accrual." This definition should explain the discovery rule theory of
Congress' choice. The legislation could read like this: As used in
chapter 2401(b) of this title, the term "accrual" in any claim except
those involving medical malpractice means that time when a claimant
is injured. In any claim involving medical malpractice, "accrual"
means that time when a claimant has knowledge or with reasonable
diligence should have knowledge of both injury and cause. Knowledge
of the injury is the critical inquiry. This section does not distinguish
injuries that are caused either by an omission or a commission.
By enacting a narrower and stricter standard modeled after the
Kubrick decision, there will be no "wiggle room" for lower level courts
to use in finagling decisions in an inequitable manner.
3. Amend Accrual Back to One Year
Congress could also repeal the 1949 amendment' 46 in order to give
potential claimants only one year to file this claim with the correct
administrative agency. 147 By returning the time limit back to one year,
but not defining the term accrual in the statute as recommended in the
previous section, the legislature will still give the judiciary the ability to
use factual distinctions in order to decide which standard - injury
discovery, government causation discovery, causation discovery or
omission/commission - the court will use in a particular case. Along
with this suggested repeal, however, Congress must also amend the
statute by creating a five-year statute of repose.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000).
146. See supra text accompanying note 21.
147. One commentator has suggested, "Congress could roll back the two-year
period for bringing all FICA actions and adopt a rule that makes state statutory
time limits on state tort actions the time limit for initiating FTCA claims." Richard
W. Bourne, A Day Late, A Dollar Short: Opening A Governmental Snare Which
Tricks Poor Victims Out of Medical Malpractice Claims, 62 U. Purr. L. REV. 87, 119
(2000).
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4. Five- Year Statute of Repose
While decreasing the period of time to file a claim other then a
discovery rule type of claim, but adding language creating a five-year
statute of repose, Congress will effectively eliminate the possibility of a
stale claim. At the same time, this statute of repose will charge
claimants with some responsibility to inquire into any wrongdoing
while the situation is still fresh in the participant's memory. "Statutes
of ultimate repose provide a counter rule to the accrual-discovery rule
by adding an alternative prescriptive period which begins running at
the time of the defendant's act rather than at the time harm was
inflicted or discovered. ' 1 48 Therefore, a clause added to the statute
could be worded in the following manner: "In no event, can suits be
commenced more then five years after the defendant's negligent
act."
, 149
VI. H.R. 4600: CONGRESS' MOST RECENT OPINION ON CLAIMS
AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS; A NEW STATUTE OF
LIMITATION FOR ALL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT?
On September 26, 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.R.
4600, entitled, Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health
Care (HEALTH) Act of 2002.150 Although the central piece of the bill
concerns capping damage awards in health care lawsuits, 5 ' the
legislation does make a meaningful statement regarding Congress'
present intent about the discovery rule in medical malpractice claims.
The statute reads:
The time for the commencement of a health care lawsuit shall be
3 years after the date of manifestation of injury or 1 year after
the claimant discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs
first. In no event shall the time for commencement of a health
148. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 557.
149. See id.
150. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH)
Act, H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002).
151. H.R. 4600 § 4 (capping damages awards).
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care lawsuit exceed 3 years after the date of manifestation of
injury unless tolled [due to fraud]. 52
Although this bill expired at the end of the 107th Congress, it was
reintroduced by Congressman Greenwood on February 5, 2003, in the
108th Congress."3
It is clear that the legislature has abandoned the word "accrual" for a
more explanatory phrase including the word "injury." By abandoning
the term accrual, extending the period to file a claim to three years,
and adding a two-part conjunctive test of which the shorter period of
time-shall apply, the legislature procures a stricter standard for
individuals than the judicially created discovery rule under the FTCA.
This is illustrative of the present Congress' clear intention regarding
the treatment of the discovery rule. It is notable that there is no
mention of cause in any part of the statute. Therefore, there will be a
strong presumption that Congress is trying to create an injury
discovery rule, which might have been the original intention of the
FTCA.
This bill's relationship to the FTCA has yet to be seen. Although on
its face the bill does not seem to affect any provisions of the FTCA,
unless the federal government will be considered a medical healthcare
provider under the definitions section of the bill,"' the clear statement
is that the government is trying to lessen the liability of healthcare
providers through a limitation on the time in which a potential
claimant can bring a suit against his provider. Taking this reasoning
and placing the federal government in the private sector's position,
sovereign immunity causes the legislation to be read more narrowly.
Therefore, a claimant against the government with a similar statute of
limitations would have a much steeper hill to climb when arguing for
the discovery rule, in addition to having only one year rather than two
to file the claim.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is imperative to the very foundation of the United States legal
system created by the Constitution that Supreme Court decisions
remain binding precedent upon the federal appellate and district
152. H.R. 4600 § 3.
153. H.R. 5,108th Cong. (2003).
154. H.R. 5 § 9; see also H.R. 4600 § 9.
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courts, as well as state courts interpreting federal law.1 5 Currently, a
claimant injured in one state will be treated differently then one
injured in another state for discovery rule purposes under the FICA.
The uncertainty of more recent precedent makes it hard for the
government to expedite these matters through the administrative
agencies and subsequently through the court systems.
156
While this paper suggests multiple ways in which to settle the
controversy of when a claim accrues under § 2401(b) in medical
malpractice cases involving the discovery rule, it is essential that one of
these recommendations be followed in order to (1) firmly establish a
clear discovery rule; (2) restore the meaning behind sovereign
immunity and how limited a waiver shall be interpreted; and (3) to
save the taxpayers billions of dollars.157 Veterans of the United States
Military who seek medical treatment from VA hospitals will be the
class of persons most affected by the proposed reforms. Although
veterans have contributed greatly to this country, the privilege
awarded to veterans and citizens with the passing of the FTCA should
and shall remain just that, a privilege, not to be extended beyond what
the legislature specifically stated, nor beyond the Supreme Court's
interpretation of such language. Although Hughes would have been a
perfect vehicle for the Supreme Court to re-clarify the Kubrick
standard, it is unquestionable that doctors will continue to commit
medical malpractice on patients, and lower courts will continue to
butcher and extend the discovery rule as they see fit. Accordingly,
chances will arise continually in the future to re-clarify the discovery
rule. It is the job of all governmental branches to be prepared.
155. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821)(asserting
appellate jurisdiction over interpretations of federal law and the Constitution by
state courts of last resort and overturning Virginia's highest court with appellate
jurisdiction).
156. Because of this lack of certainty, administrative agencies are hesitant to
deny claims when there is a discovery rule issue presenting. This hesitancy can be
shown through a shockingly high amount of motions for summary judgment and
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction once the action comes before a
federal district court. See Sexton v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 755 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Hughes, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15740, at *2. If the decision is made on the
statute of limitations issue in favor of the claimant, the case is usually not litigated
any further, but rather settled by the government as the merits of these cases and
the evidence established are usually more than ample to support a decision against
the government.
157. The treasury fund that pays these claims is financed with taxpayer monies.
